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State Society and 
Governance in Melanesia 
 
Central to the Australian Government’s approach to the Southwest Pacific is the 
view that Australia has a special role to play in the region.  Enhancing Australia’s 
leadership role in contributing to security and stability in the region is at the core 
of this approach. The perceived withdrawal from the region by the United States 
has heightened the importance of Australia’s role and to a lesser extent New Zea-
land’s, which has been Australia’s main partner in regional peacekeeping opera-
tions.   
 
According to some commentators, Australia’s dominant role in the region is now 
being challenged by China, which has increased its use of ‘soft power’ in the re-
gion, primarily through diplomatic and economic influence.  Some sources esti-
mate that China has become the third largest provider of foreign assistance in the 
region, consisting mostly of loans, infrastructure and large construction projects 
(which, unlike Australian aid, is notably free of any preconditions on the part of 
receiving countries - the one exception being the adherence by receiving countries 
to the 'one-China' policy). 
 
The rise of China is not limited to the Pacific region.  China has been increasing 
its diplomatic and economic ties elsewhere, most notably in Latin America, the 
Caribbean and Africa. Although commentators remain divided about China’s 
long-term intensions, suggested motives for its increased engagement across the 
globe include the need for domestic harmony and regional stability to ensure 
China’s continued economic development (which has consistently averaged 11% 
per annum in recent years), the drive to secure energy supplies and other natural 
resources, and its national identity as a good neighbour and responsible world citi-
zen.  China’s rivalry with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition from Pacific Island 
nations presents another key motivating factor for China’s increased engagement 
in the Pacific region. 
 
China is not alone in increasing its focus on the Southwest Pacific region.  In 2006 
summits focusing on the region were held by China, Taiwan and Japan.  Major 
increases in development aid were announced at all three summits.  The diplo-
matic tussles between these countries - most notably the competition between 
China and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition by Pacific Island countries and 
China’s opposition to Japan’s desire to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Secu-
rity Council - complicate the scene and have the potential to interfere with the 
domestic politics of Pacific Island countries.  The United States has also recently 
re-entered the picture—in early 2007 the Bush Administration pledged to re-
engage with the region and declared 2007 the ‘Year of the Pacific’.         
 
The increased engagement in the region by China and Taiwan, combined with the 
growing economic presence of the Chinese in the Pacific (including Chinese and 
Taiwanese governments and nationals, overseas Chinese, and locally born Pacific 
Island Chinese), have contributed to a growing resentment towards ethnic Chinese 
in the region.  Rioting in 2006 in both Tonga and the Solomon Islands in which 
Chinese businesses were targeted attracted significant media attention.  The in-
creased presence of China in the region, and the growing resentment towards the 
ethnic Chinese in Pacific Island countries, have direct implications for Australia’s 
development assistance to the region. 
 
 
Key Points 
• The Australian Government’s foreign pol-
icy in the Southwest Pacific is based on 
the view that Australia has a key role to 
play in the region, particularly in contrib-
uting to security and stability.   
• In recent years, China has increased its 
presence in the region, with some sources 
estimating that China is now the third larg-
est provider of foreign assistance in the 
region. 
• Chinese businesses have a growing pres-
ence, with over 3,000 Chinese state-owned 
and private enterprises registered in the 
Pacific region, representing investments of 
about $800 million.  
• The competition between China and Tai-
wan for diplomatic recognition by Pacific 
Island countries has intensified in recent 
years. 
• Perceived interference by China and Tai-
wan in domestic politics, coupled with the 
strong economic presence of the ethnic-
Chinese in Pacific Island countries, has 
contributed to a growing resenting among 
ethnic Chinese in the region. 
• Financial assistance provided to Pacific 
Island countries by China and Taiwan has 
the potential to frustrates Australia’s at-
tempt to link the provision of aid with im-
proved governance outcomes. 
China’s Premier Wen Jiabao at the first China-Pacific 
Islands Countries Economic Development & Coopera-
tion Forum held in Fiji in April 2006.. Photo courtesy 
of  Islands Business 
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CHINESE BUSINESSES IN THE PACIFIC 
The profile of Chinese in the Pacific is also being raised by 
the strong and growing business presence in the region - 
over 3,000 Chinese state-owned and private enterprises have 
been registered in the Pacific region, with investments of 
about $800 million.  Investment by China and Taiwan has 
been welcomed by the governments of Papua New Guinea, 
Fiji and Solomon Islands as part of their “look north” 
foreign policies.   
 
While Chinese businesses have been operating legitimate 
and valued businesses in the region for several decades, in 
some instances businesses in the new wave of arrivals (post 
1980) have been associated with criminal activities.  Some 
new arrivals are involved in short-term extractive industries, 
such as logging, and profits are frequently invested overseas 
rather than in the local community.  The tendency to employ 
Chinese workers and, in some cases, the treatment of local 
workers by Chinese businesses have also been highlighted 
in the media in some Pacific Island countries. These factors 
have contributed to a perception that Chinese businesses 
operating in the region are not sensitive to local community 
needs.  
 
THE CHINESE POPULATION IN THE PACIFIC 
ISLANDS 
Although as discussed above, the Chinese population in the 
Pacific Island region is economically influential, the number 
of Chinese in the region remains low.  Chinese populations 
in the Pacific Islands generally make up less than 1 per cent 
of the total population.  Emeritus Professor Ron Crocombe 
estimated the total Chinese population in the Pacific Islands 
at around 80,000 as of October 2006.  The main 
concentrations are around 20,000 each in Papua New 
Guinea and Fiji, 15,000 in the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marianas, 14,000 in French Polynesia, and 4,000 
in Guam. 
 
The leading authority on Chinese communities in the Pacific 
Islands, Emeritus Professor Bill Willmott, emphasises that 
these communities are distinct from each other and also 
internally differentiated by factors such as class, time of 
arrival, and place of origin.  While Pacific Island Chinese 
develop a local identity, local loyalties and local connections 
over time, most still marry other Chinese, and family 
remains their prime social focus.  Rates of inter-marriage 
between Chinese communities and local indigenous 
populations vary between localities.  Chinese Pacific 
Islanders are invariably prominent in business, although the 
most recent generation are also well represented in 
professions such as doctors and lawyers.   
 
Concern has been expressed, often in local media, about 
recent Chinese arrivals' lack of sensitivity to local ways.  
Many in the local communities are just as likely to view 
these arrivals as disruptive competitors rather than as 
potential business or marriage partners.  These latter 
arrivals, known as huayi, are distinguished from previous 
migrants by their weak ties to mainland China and their high 
degree of mobility in search of opportunities in the global 
economy.  While businesses of the more established 
Chinese benefit locals, those of huayi tend towards 'get rich 
quick' enterprises that bring little benefit to local 
communities.   
 
Until the 1980s, Chinese came to the Pacific Islands in 
limited numbers as traders or labourers.  Chinese migration 
into the Pacific has increased markedly since the opening up 
of China and the economic reform program initiated by 
Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s.  This period also saw a 
rise of activities in Island states to extract relatively 
untapped natural resources, such as timber, fish and 
minerals.  These activities are largely controlled by huayi 
businessmen from Chinese Diaspora communities in 
Southeast and East Asia who invest their profits overseas.  
They have allies within the ranks of local politicians, but are 
generally disliked by the local population as a whole.  The 
post-1980 wave of Chinese initially consisted largely of 
low-skilled factory and extractive industry workers.  This 
new wave gradually expanded into other sectors.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PACIFIC ISLAND 
COUNTRIES 
The small island states of the Pacific have much to gain 
from the increased engagement with China.  China provides 
an alternative to traditional donors to Pacific Island 
countries (which - with the exception of adherence to the 
‘one-China’ policy - is free of the pre-conditions 
accompanying aid from Australia and other funding bodies).  
Increased engagement with the Chinese also offers new 
opportunities for economic growth and development in the 
region.   
 
However, the relative poverty of these nations, coupled with 
their lack of appropriate institutional mechanisms to ensure 
political and bureaucratic accountability, leave them prone 
to financial influence and corruption.  In particular, there is 
concern that without appropriate safeguards, aid assistance 
may not be directed to where it is most needed or it may find 
the way into the hands local politicians or officials.  The 
problems associated with this competition can be 
exacerbated when the practice of gift giving - an inherent 
practice in many Pacific Island cultures - is exploited. 
 
Opinion remains divided on the consequences of the 
increased presence of China in the Pacific Islands.  There is 
general consensus amongst commentators that the political 
rivalry between China and Taiwan in the Pacific does not 
provide an environment conducive for the most effective use 
of development assistance.  There is also concern that the 
China-Taiwan rivalry is planting the seeds for longer-term 
tensions for Pacific Island nations. 
 
Graeme Dobell and others note mounting concern in the 
Pacific Islands, Canberra and, to a lesser extent Wellington, 
about the implications for Island state stability due to the 
rising Chinese presence.  At particular issue is Chinese 
crime syndicates and corrupt businessmen, and the rivalry 
between China and Taiwan fostering corruption in domestic 
politics due to their failure to adhere to the normal rules of 
the ‘aid game’ and to the recent OECD guidelines for donor 
assistance.  Dobell notes that these concerns have only 
gathered momentum in the last five years, with China's 
economic take off and the perceived diminishing of US 
influence in the Asia Pacific region.  Former New Zealand 
diplomat Michael Powles is less concerned, believing 
China's record and statements consistently demonstrate a 
willingness to abide by international conventions, while 
obviously pursuing its own national interest.   
 
The increased engagement in the region by China and 
Taiwan, and the growing business presence in the region of 
ethnic Chinese, have contributed to a growing resentment 
towards ethnic Chinese in the region.  In some cases, public 
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Box 1:  The Chinese Population in Papua New Guinea 
 
Papua New Guinea has one of the largest population of Chinese in the Pacific, currently estimated at 20,000.  The first 
large group of Chinese (the ‘Old Chinese’) came to Papua New Guinea in 1889 as indentured labourers for the Ger-
mans.  Nearly all were repatriated at the end of their contracts.  By 1913 there were just over 1,000 free Chinese mi-
grants in German New Guinea.  When Australia acquired New Guinea as a Mandated Territory in 1921, it immediately 
applied the Australian Immigration Act, which further limited Chinese immigration.  The small Chinese population that 
remained in the country tended to be unobtrusive politically and socially.  Although there were minor incidents in 
which resentment was expressed against Chinese businesses, there was little overt racial antagonism. 
 
After World War II there was a significant change in Australian immigration policy - the New Guinea Chinese were 
allowed to take Australian citizenship.  This, combined with the turmoil in postwar China and the victory of the com-
munists that effectively prevented the New Guinea Chinese from visiting mainland China, contributed to a tendency for 
the Chinese community to develop stronger ties with Australia.  When independence was achieved in 1975, many of 
the Chinese in Papua New Guinea had Australian citizenship and investments in Australia.   
 
In the 1980s the foreign population of Papua New Guinea underwent significant change.  In 1972, there were over 
50,000 non-citizens in the country; of these the most numerous were Australians.  Around 3,500 were Asians (nearly 
all were Chinese by ethnicity but not by place of birth or nationality).  The total number of foreigners in the country 
declined after the country gained independence, as more foreigners chose to leave.  There was also a sharp change in 
the composition of the foreign population - during the 1980s Asians began to outnumber Australians.  By the 2000 cen-
sus, the total non-citizens were fewer than 20,000, with Australians making up just 19% of this figure. 
 
The visible Chinese presence in Papua New Guinea is not reflected in the official census figures. According to the most 
recent census in 2000 the Chinese made up fewer than 15% of the non-citizen population. But informal estimates put 
the Chinese population at well over 10,000, which would make them the most numerous of all foreigners in the coun-
try.  Possible reasons why they do not show up in official statistics include: they are the citizens of countries other than 
China, they have arrived illegally, and/or they have entered since the 2000 census. 
 
Emeritus Professor Hank Nelson recently categorised the Chinese population in Papua New Guinea into four groups:   
1. The Old Chinese who were in New Guinea when Austra-
lia took control of the German colony and who survived 
the war against Japan; they were allowed to take Austra-
lian citizenship from 1957.  Many developed merchant, 
shipping and plantation interests in Australian New 
Guinea and later Papua.  Few from this group now remain 
in the country. 
2. The Chinese from Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia, 
who have broader business interests—they are best known 
through their investments in timber.  Their direct engage-
ment with politicians and aggressive public relations tac-
tics contrast with the unobtrusive approach of the ‘Old 
Chinese’, and allegation of corruption in the public and 
private sectors are rife.  The Rimbunan Hijau group—the 
largest logging company operating in PNG—also owns 
the daily newspaper (The National).  
3. The Chinese from mainland China, whose entry is sanc-
tioned and supported by the People’s Republic of China (often with a focus on obtaining resources).  The commit-
ment of the Chinese company Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) to develop the Ramu nickel / cobalt mine 
highlights the shift of Chinese capital, expertise and labour into Papua New Guinea.   
4. The Chinese, most from mainland China, who have entered Papua New Guinea illegally or have over-stayed their 
visas, and who now dominate many small businesses.  Some are engaged in illegal or marginally illegal businesses, 
and there are some connections within this group to gangs and organized crime.   
While the ‘old Chinese’ generally kept clear of politics, some of the more recent Chinese migrants are aggressively 
involved in decision-making from local government through to national department heads and cabinet.  The increased 
profile of the Chinese population, including their obvious success in small business, and a perception that Chinese in-
terests have benefited in some cases from political favours, has generated resentment among some Papua New Gui-
neans.   This resentment has been expressed in various newspaper articles and letters to the editors of the local newspa-
pers - issues of concern include environmental and human rights abuses, tax evasion and the flow of illegal immigrants 
into the country.   
Chinese Ambassador to PNG, Wei Ruxing, PM Sir Michael 
Somare & MCC Chairman, Yang Changheng toast the 
Ramu mine. Photo courtesy of The National 
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anger against the national government has spilled over into 
the simmering resentment against ethnic Chinese businesses.  
An example is the rioting in Nuku’alofa, Tonga in 2006, in 
which three-quarters of the commercial district was 
destroyed.  The riots were alleged to have been sparked by 
anger over the perceived slow pace of political reforms - 
frustration over unemployment and the growth of ethnic 
Chinese-owned businesses were also blamed.  
Approximately thirty Chinese-owned businesses were 
destroyed and in the aftermath between 200-300 Chinese 
nationals returned to China.  Chinese businesses were also 
targeted in rioting in Honiara in 2006 in post-election 
violence. Among the allegations of the rioters was that both 
the former and newly-appointed governments were corrupt 
and unduly influenced by local Chinese businesses and 
interests and Taiwan government money.      
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA  
Diminishing Australian influence and increased Chinese 
influence are the new Pacific regional realities Australia 
must plan for.  Australia faces a major decision about its 
Pacific policy in regard to the increasing Chinese influence 
in the region.  The cost and difficulties involved in 
operations in Solomon Islands and East Timor suggest that 
Australia cannot go it alone.   
 
Unconditional aid provided by the Chinese Government and 
Taiwan may exacerbate underlying political, economic and 
social problems in the region.  The lack of preconditions 
accompanying expanding Chinese aid is particularly 
problematic from the Australia Government’s perspective, as 
it has potential to frustrate Australia’s efforts to link  the 
provision of development aid to Pacific Island nations to 
improved governance outcomes.  A recent example is Fiji, 
where Chinese aid has complicated attempts by Australia 
and New Zealand to tie aid to democratic reforms by the 
military government.   
 
There is concern that the China-Taiwan rivalry is planting 
the seeds for long-term tensions in the Southwest Pacific and 
that it does not provide an environment conducive for the 
most effective use of development assistance.  The 2006 
Pacific Island summit held by Japan, at which new aid to 
Pacific Island nations was announced, introduces another 
element with potential to impact on the region.  The 
possibility of a three-way bidding war between China, 
Taiwan and Japan for support from Pacific Island countries 
has been raised. 
 
The Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee's report on the implications of China's rising 
prominence urged adherence to the OECD principles on 
official development assistance by all parties in the Pacific, 
and recommended that Australia should cooperate with 
China on development assistance in the Pacific. The 
principles were field tested in nine countries over 2006-2007, 
including in Solomon Islands. Although the results of the 
pilot were promising, the question of how to engage non-
OECD countries in supporting these types of principles 
remains.   
 
Paul D’Arcy has broadly identified two main scenarios for 
future engagement with the region: 
 
• Increase Australian aid to Pacific Island nations in an 
attempt to counter Chinese influence in the Pacific and 
persuade or influence Pacific Island governments to 
adopt policies it sees as best for the region.  
  
• Seek to work cooperatively with China and Taiwan 
and Pacific Island governments to deliver development 
that benefits Islanders and preserves all parties' 
national interests through a degree of compromise.   
 
Whether Australia’s future foreign policy centres around 
either or both of the above, there is increasing consensus in 
Canberra and Wellington that interventions to restore order 
in Pacific Island nations experiencing unrest, such as in the 
Solomon Islands and Tonga, must be accompanied by much 
longer-term, deeper engagements to tackle the root causes of 
problems and dissatisfaction in Pacific Island nations.  This 
intermeshing of local, regional and global interests has 
complicated the search for solutions, highlighting the need to 
work closely with Island countries and also with 
international partners, now including China, in delivering 
improved development aid and governance outcomes in 
recipient countries.   
 
This briefing note was based on Paul D’Arcy’s paper 
‘Introduction: A New Era in Chinese-Pacific Engagement’ 
and  Hank Nelson’s paper ‘The Chinese in Papua New 
Guinea’.  Nancy Krause compiled the Policy Briefing Note 
based on this work.   
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